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          Department of Economic and Social History
     University  of  GlasgowIn October 1999 Gordon Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, gave the Mais lecture
at the City University.    He took as his theme 'The conditions for full employment' and
used the famous 1944 White Paper on Employment Policy as his starting point
(http//www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press/1999/p168_99.html).   From this he proceeded to
give a potted history of the development of economic policy in Britain and to highlight
the reasons why postwar governments, both Labour and Conservative, had failed to
maintain full employment and growth.  Central to his analysis was the need,
recognised in the White Paper, for the achievement of four conditions, stability,
employability, productivity and responsibility, if employment policy was to be
successful.    Postwar governments had failed to achieve this necessary combination of
requirements, whereas, with typical politician's optimism, the current Labour
government had put in place a framework of policies which would correct these
previous failings (Eccleshall 2000, pp.157-8).
Apart from its use (or abuse) of the White Paper, the lecture is of interest for
highlighting two points.   First, it emphasises the importance of institutional aspects
of Britain's postwar economic problems and poor performance, significantly locating
the failings in the nature of Britain's postwar settlement.    There is a considerable
degree of consensus amongst economic historians that Britain's postwar settlement
was inappropriate for the achievement of good economic performance (Broadberry and
Crafts 1996, Middleton 1996).   As Eichengreen has argued, unlike the rest of Western
Europe where the postwar settlement resulted in growth enhancing institutional
arrangements based on the co-operation of government, business and labour, Britain
ended up with 'a problematic hybrid of northern European and US capitalism'
(Eichengreen and Iversen 1999, p.130; Eichengreen 1996).  Secondly, there is an
assumption that government has the ability to correct these institutional failings,
eventhough the achievement of conditions like 'responsibility' could not be imposed
directly by government policy.  Again, this is a position commonly taken, not only by
politicians but also by economic historians, reflecting their, often implicit, model of
policy-making.  This paper will examine these two aspects and argue that
'government does matter'.   It will, however, challenge the conventional criticisms of
government and argue that we need to give more attention to the policy process in
order to understand policy outcomes.  The first section will set out alternative
approaches to policy- making.  The second will apply these to the formulation of
economic policy in the period 1945-64, with nationalisation, monetary policy, incomes
policy and the creation of the National Economic Development Council (NEDC) being
used in particular as case studies.    The third section then puts this analysis into a
wider context by considering the institutional framework which existed in Britain at
this time.   Together these elements, it is hoped, will provide a more sophisticated
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There is a common tendency amongst economic historians to assume government has
the ability to influence the economy and to create the appropriate institutional
arrangements, and to develop their criticisms accordingly.    This attitude can vary
from qualified and relatively mild criticism of government policy (Owen 1999, p.460) to
attempts to illustrate a direct link between inappropriate policy and poor economic
performance (Foreman-Peck and Hannah 1999, p.52).    Government is seen as strong,
with poor performance a sign of governmental failure, justifying criticism (Kirby 1992,
pp.654 and 656).   Nick Crafts has suggested, 'Recongnising that institutions matter
ssreminds us that changing them usually involves governments, and emphasises the
need to think about economic growth in the context of political economy' (Crafts 1995,
p.445).   This is not an easy task and there has been a tendency to focus on the first
half of the sentence: involving government is seen to mean government responsibility
and capacity to change institutions, and with that culpability if performance is judged
poor.
This approach to government policy making is underpinned by an implicit model of a
powerful and unitary state, with power focussed a the apex of a hierarchical pyramid,
that is with ministers and the central coordinating departments, such as the Treasury
in the case of economic policy.  Such a view has a long history.  It is a typical
conceptualisation of top-down coordination in government (Peters 1998a, p.298).
Indeed, for a long time this perception of government was regarded as the mode of
governance (J gensen et al. 1998, p.512; Bogason and Toonen 1998, p.214).  This
conventional steering model distinguishes between policy formulation and
implementation and the criterion of success of failure is attainment of the formal policy
goals (Kickert et al. 1997, pp.7-8; Marsh 1998a, p.9).   This general model has been
seen as particularly appropriate in the British case where the 'Westminster model' of
British politics has been the dominant organising perspective for many years.
Although a range of versions of the model exist, its broad features are: parliamentary
sovereignty; strong cabinet government; accountability through elections; majority
party control of the executive; elaborate conventions for the conduct of parliamentary
business; institutionalised opposition and the rules of debate (Gamble 1990, p.407;
Bevir and Rhodes 1999, pp.216-18).   As a result, Britain 'is generally perceived as
having a hierarchical and unified political system with power concentrated in the
central institutions of the state' (Smith 1998a, p.45).  Although criticism of this
paradigm developed from the 1960s in political science it has remained the dominant
approach until recently (Smith 1998a, p.47).    It is unsurprising, therefore, that thisapproach has so strongly informed the work of economic historians.
However, in recent years both the general hierarchical view of government and the
'Westminster model' have been strongly criticised as presenting a misleading and very
partial picture of British government (Rhodes 1997a; Rhodes 1997b; Smith 1998a;
Smith 1999).   In part these charges have been a response to perceived changes in
governments and their context since the 1980s.    It is argued that these changes have
rendered the model inappropriate.   First, there has been a 'hollowing out' of central
government with the hiving off of responsibilities to agencies, privatisation, the loss of
functions the EU, and the introduction of new public management (Rhodes 1994;
Rhodes 1997a; Weller et al. 1997).    Secondly, it has been argued that processes related
to globalisation are limiting the freedom of national governments to act as they might
wish (Schmidt 1995).     Accordingly, the policy process, it is argued, has become more
complex and more contingent on other actors.    The British polity, and other polities,
have become differentiated and fragmented.   In this context, policy networks rather
than hierarchies become a more efficient form of governance and, as such, are seen in
the German literature to be the emerging form of governance (B rzel 1998; Marsh
1998a, pp.8-9).
How relevant is this framework to the study of policy-making in the past?   On one
level it would appear of relatively little relevance compared to the 'Westminster model'.
As already noted, in the German literature policy networks are a specific and new form
of governance.    This view has had some influence in Britain Rhodes and Smith, tow of
the most influential British authors in this field, have both referred to the shift from
government to governance in recent years (Rhodes 1997b; Smith 1998b).   However,
this is an issue of degree rather than absolutes: it is easy to exaggerate the extent to
which state power has diminished (Weiss 1998, pp.189-90; Marsh 1998b, p.190).
Equally, it is easy to exaggerate the extent to which the Westminster model was a
reality, rather than an always partial model.   As Smith himself has put it:
The Westminster model clearly reflected empirical reality to a certain extent.
Power was concentrate within the parliamentary system, the exercise of power
was hierarchical and the system was relatively closed to outside influences.
Whilst this approach may have reflected, to some extent, political reality
particularly pre-war it was always too narrow in its focus (Smith 1998a, pp.46-7).
Peters has put the point differently in reviewing Rhodes' work:
One [issue] is whether those networks or something like them have not always
been present, and what has changed is the theory rather than the reality (Peters1998b, p.408).
Indeed, much of the British literature uses the policy networks approach simply as an
analytical tool (B rzel 1998).   Given this it seems that the use of this approach offers
the potential for some interesting insights into post-war policy, although some have
found problems in applying the approach with rigour to Whitehall (Marsh, Richards
and Smith 1998).
There are three key features to the approach to be noted.    First, power is viewed as
relational and fluid rather than absolute.    Each actor holds some resources which
endow it with some power.  Thus actors are interdependent (Smith 1993).  Put
another way, policy formulation is not necessarily a zero sum game with, for example,
two actors battling for dominance, but is potentially a positive sum game when two
actors co-operate.  Secondly, reflecting these interdependencies, fragmentation and
differentiation typify the core executive of government as much as strength (Rhodes
1997a, p.13).  Following from this, each network will be unique.  Thirdly, policy
networks affect policy outcomes (Marsh and Rhodes 1992).   There has been criticism
of this for confusing structure and agency but the literature remains firm in its belief
that the networks as institutions matter even when they are temporary, flexible and
fast moving (Dowding 1995; Marsh 1998a; Marsh, Richards and Smith 1998).
Accordingly, the policy network approach offers a very different organising perspective
to that of the Westminster model which has appeared so dominant, if often implicitly,
in the economic history literature.
The application of the approach to the growth of the welfare state has already occurred
in recognition of the growth of social provision by governments after the Second World
War (J rgensen et al. 1998, p.499; Hindmoor 1998).   Nevertheless, despite Atkinson
and Coleman noting that the new responsibilities which post-war governments took on
in the field of economic policy posed similar challenges, there has been little attempt to
date to apply the policy networks approach here (Atkinson and Coleman 1992, p.155).
It is intended to illustrate how the approach adds to our understanding of economic
policy-making in post-war Britain.
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The Second World War is conventionally regarded as 'the high point of achievement in
the history of the British civil service' (Hennessy 1989, p.88).    Significantly, this was a
period when the UK had an extremely powerful wartime state (Harris 1990, p.91).    It
also marked the addition of a wide range of new responsibilities for central government,such as the commitment to the maintenance of a high and stable level of employment
in the White Paper on Employment Policy.   The Labour government after the war
extended these responsibilities further with its commitment to economic planning and
to nationalisation.  Given the maintenance after the war of economic controls, the
ability to manipulate demand through budgetary and monetary policy and the
bringing of key industries into the public sector, it has been widely assumed that these
tools offered the ability to control the economy:
There was a hierarchical bureaucracy which enabled decisions to be made in the
centre and implemented.    There was control over a sovereign territory, and there
were a number of instruments from the general Keynesian demand management
to the particular-nationalisation-which enabled intervention in the economic
sphere.    Through these mechanisms the state controlled large parts of the public
and private sectors (Smith 1998a, p.61).
Certainly, the Treasury was keen to re-establish its inter-war dominance in Whitehall
after the Second World War, all the more so because the role of finance had been
downplayed during the war.   In this sense Keynesian demand management offered a
means of establishing control over public expenditure by demanding a budget surplus
to deal with the post-war problem of inflation (Rollings 1985 and 1988).   The linking
of economic and financial responsibilities with the appointment of Sir Stafford Cripps
as Chancellor of the Exchequer in November 1947 is commonly seen to confirm the
Tresury's return to pre-eminence in Whitehall (Cairncross 1985, p.53).    Thereafter the
Treasury continued to view economic policy-making as hierarchical and one of control.
Those institutional changes that were made after 1945 ultimately had little impact.
The Steering Committee on Economic Development was created in 1945 as a
committee of the permanent secretaries of the main economic departments but soon it
had become little more than a rubber stamp for a small number of memoranda, like the
annual Economic Survey (Alford et al. 1992, p.445).   The Economic Planning Board,
set up in 1947 as part of the reorganisation of the machinery of economic policy
provides another illustration.  Although established as a tripartite body where the
representatives of labour and business would meet with senior officials, very quickly
there were complaints about the nature of the dialogue, with the representatives of
employers' organisations threatening to resign in 1950 (Alford et al. 1992, p.466 and
p.921).
This hierarchical approach to policy-making remained the basis of Treasury thinking
through the 1950s.   When in the late 1950s discussion of Britain's relative economic
decline came to the fore, there was a growing demand for the need to modernise the
machinery of government, in particular to reduce the power of the Treasury(Theakston 1995, p.84; Balogh 1959; Chapman 1963).  However, a common response
to such problems from those who see themselves at the apex of a hierarchy is to
attempt to improve co-ordination by increasing centralisation.   Thus Smith suggests
that various post-war British governments attempted to reassert Treasury control
(Smith 1998b, p.13) The Treasury itself believed that it needed to re-establish its
position as the dominant department in Whitehall at this time.    For example, the
perceived failure of monetary policy from 1955 led to the famous Radcliffe Committee
on the working of the monetary system and its 1959 Report which made a number of
recommendations about the responsibility for monetary policy (Radcliffe 1959).  The
background to this was a slowly growing discontent in the Treasury with the Bank of
England's handing of monetary policy (Ringe and Rollings 2000a; Fforde 1992;
Cairncross 1987).  However, when the committee's Report recommended shifting
decision-making to the Treasury, Treasury officials turned down the opportunity.
This was not a denial of power but a result of the Treasury's determination to prevent
the Board of Trade from becoming involved as the committee also recommended (Ringe
and Rollings 2000a).    Similarly, as Lowe notes, the Plowden Committee on the control
of public expenditure 'was a restricted enquiry which tended to grow ever more
restricted.... Treasury officials, and in particularʦOttoʧClarke, had an increasingly
dominant influenceʟ( Lowe 1997, p.476).
The Treasury was also willing to try new mechanisms to re-establish control.    The
Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes, set up in 1957 was an attempt by the
Treasury to introduce a new instrument to establish wage restraint without the
government being seen to be interfering directly (Ringe unpublished).   Behind the
scenes the Treasury was heavily involved in the appointment of the council's members,
attempted to pre-determine the council's first report and put pressure on the council to
report quickly.   In addition, the council's secretary was a member of the Economic
Section of the Treasury who kept his colleagues closely informed of the council's
deliberations.    Likewise, the Treasury tried to impose its agenda on the newly created
National Economic Development Council (NEDC) (Ringe and Rollings 2000b).
Treasury officials viewed this new body as an opportunity to place difficult issues on
the 'tripartite plate' (PRO 1961b).    This did not simply mean raising these issues with
labour and business representatives but also with other Whitehall departments.
However, that the Treasury felt the need to use these independent bodies as a way of
asserting Treasury control hints of desperation.  The reality of policy-making
illustrated a lack of control and the extent of fragmentation that existed.    Martin
Chick has shown the severe problems experienced in trying to control investment in
the 1940s (Chick 1998), the export programme, so crucial to solving the balance of
payments problem, had to rest on a programme of propaganda exhorting increasedexports (Cairncross 1985; Crofts 1989), and David Edgerton has shown how the
policies and attitudes of the Ministry of Supply towards industry were completely
different from those in the Board of Trade (Edgerton 1992).  The nationalised
industries illustrate well the extent to which government was dependent on other
economic actors rather than able to control and direct them in the perceived national
interest.    This was not simply case of the failure of the Morrisonian public corporation
to offer control but also reflected asymmetries of information which gave the
nationalised industries key advantages in their discussions    with government (Alford
et al. 1992; Chick 1998, pp.92-102; Tomilinson 1997, pp.117-23).   As Chick notes of the
British Electricity Authority (BEA), 'if anything, nationalisation strengthened the
industry's position in its relationship with government, by allowing the industry to
exploit the government's increased political responsibility for the performance of the
now-nationalised industry' (Chick 1998, p.97).    Thus the BEA was successfully able to
resist key government proposals on price and output.
Similar issues relate to the demand management policies followed after 1945.    It is
common to view Keynesian demand management as a technical and political exercise
where the government judged the macroeconomic state of the economy and responded
by either stimulating it or deflating it (Brittan 1969).   This, it is often argued, was
particularly true of the Conservative governments of the 1950s with their reliance on
fiscal and monetary policy and attempts to 'fine tune' the economy (Tomlinson 1995).
Criticism of macroeconomic policy in this period, such as Dow's seminal work, have
focussed on the technical flaws, such as the time lags involved before policy became
effective (Dow 1965).    The public choice literature, by contrast, highlights the ability
of politicians and civil servants to abuse the tools for their own ends (Buchanan et al.
1978).   Nevertheless, in each it is assumed, implicitly if not explicitly, that the core
executive has the ability to determine policy.    Indeed, this is central to the public
choice critique.
Yet there is much evidence, expanding as the public records have become available,
that the core executive, (that is ministers and the central coordinating departments,
and the Treasury in particular), had great problems controlling the policy process at
this time.   We have already seen that the Treasury became increasingly concerned
over the Bank of England's operation of monetary policy and that it was ignoring
Treasury demands.   Such was the breakdown in relations that the Treasury Solicitor
was asked in secret whether:
1. the Treasury had powers to direct the Bank of England to give directions to
bankers,
2. the Treasury had power under subsection (1) of    Section 4 of the 1946 Act togive such directions to the Bank of England that it would be forced itself to
give directions to the bankers in pursuance of subsection (3) (dealing with the
Bank of England's powers to give directions to bankers),
3. the Treasury had powers to dismiss the Court of Directors of the Bank, and
4. what action could be taken against the Bank, the Bank, should the Bank fail
to comply with directions given to them by the Treasury in pursuance of
subsection (1) of section (4) of the 1946 Act.
Significantly, none of the questions were answered in the affirmative or offered any
practicable lever to bring pressure to bear on the Bank (PRO 1957a).    More than this,
when the Radcliffe Report's criticisms of the Bank emerged, and with it proposals to
shift the primacy in decision-making to the Treasury, the Bank was able to bring
pressure to bear by exploiting the Treasury's own concerns to nullify these change
(Ringe and Rollings 2000a).
A similar story can be told with regard to the control public expenditure (Lowe 1989).
As Lowe has shown, the Treasury in attempting to regain control merely ended up
having to submit to the wishes of other departments.    The development of incomes
policy provides a third example.    The Conservative government found that it had little
control over wages in the nationalised industry (PRO 1958) and when the Treasury in
1957 decided that the government had to play a more continuously interventionist role
in private sector wage negotiations, the Minister of Labour and his officials
successfully defended their position as independent conciliator in industrial disputes
(PRO 1957b).
If the Treasury had such problems with implementing demand management, it is
unsurprising that these difficulties were replicated in the early 1960s when the
Treasury attempted, and largely failed, to get other Whitehall departments to take on
board its analysis of the causes of Britain's relatively poor economic performance
(Ringe and Rollins 2000b).  A whole range of issues were highlighted under the
umbrella of obstacles to economic growth and national efficiency: misdirection of
investment, training of labour, wage inflation, aid to industry, restrictive practices in
business, retailing and labour, tariff protection, the burden of taxation and the need for
public expenditure, especially on social services, to take 'national efficiency'
considerations into account (PRO 1961).  The Treasury's purpose was to focus
minister's and their officials' minds on the sacrifices necessary to increase output per
worker and to highlight the obstacles to the effective operation of a market economy.
When this strategy did not work Treasury officials decided to use the newly formed
NEDC as a way of getting their views on to the policy agenda; but it was to little effect.These various examples could be construed as symptomatic of a weak Treasury in the
post-war period.   Certainly, they bring into question the common view of an ever and
all-powerful Treasury.    However, the weak/strong dichotomy is an oversimplification
(Atkinson and Coleman 1992, p.163).    In other policy areas the Treasury remained
remarkably strong, for example in its ability to retain control over the budget and
delay the reform of budgetary accounts (Rollings 1996).   Samuel Beer's classic study
of the Treasury in the 1950s was not called Treasury control without reason (Beer
1956).   Indeed, many accounts of Britain's post-war economic problems focus on the
power of the Treasury (Balogh 1959).   Rather, the Treasury displayed a mixture of
strength and weakness (Lowe and Rollings 2000). Its ability to achieve its goals varied
because its power was relational rather than absolute and that each relationship
involved different interdependencies.  Thus we have a complex and fragmented
Whitehall where diverse networks of relations existed and through which the policy
process had to operate.   More than this, the traditional public/private distinction has
become blurred.
Given the complexity and fragmentation apparent in the core executive after the
Second World War as a result of the government's new responsibilities and
commitments, further attempts at centralisation and co-ordination by the government
and the Treasury were likely to be ineffective (Peters 1998, p.299a).   Nevertheless, it
would be na ve to expect the Treasury, a department of control, to move effortlessly
towards the acceptance of the interdependencies which have been illustrated.   Not
only would this not fit in with Treasury institutional biases but it would also have
required the development of very different skills in dealing with departments,
involving resource exchange and trust, or as Rhodes calls it 'diplomacy', where 'the
emphasis lies not in imposing one's objectives on another but on finding out about the
other's (Rhodes 1997b, p.46).    In any case such a step would have been far ahead of its
time given the unquestioning acceptance of the Westminister model in academic circles
until into the 1960s and amongst policy practitioners for a good deal longer (Smith
1998s).    Indeed, Jose Harris has noted how little intellectual time was devoted in
Britain to the concept of the state after the war (Harris 1996).   This reflected the
absence of an agreed philosophy of public purpose in Britain (Marquand 1988) which
was part of a wider unquestioning acceptance of the traditional position and role of the
state Shonfield 1965, p.88).
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This is wider context needs to be added at this point. Networks highlight
differentiation and fragmentation and have been used to emphasis the importance of
moving away from grand macro-level generalisations about state-society
generalisations (Gamble 1995, p.525; Smith 1993, p.233).  Nevertheless,macropolitical structures cannot be ignored: the wider institutional relationships need
to be incorporated as crucial factors. As Atkinson and Coleman suggest, 'Corporatist
and collaborative networks are simply less likely to develop in institutional
environments that nurture pressure pluralism' (Atkinson and Coleman 1992, p.166).
Skocpol and Weir have made a similar point:
The administrative, fiscal, coercive, and judicial arrangements of given states, as
well as the policies that states are already pursuing, influence the conceptions
that groups or their representatives are likely to develop about what is desirable,
or possible at all, in the realm of governmental action (Skocpol and Weir 1985,
p.118).
Two important points flow this.    First, commentators and historians often point policy
frameworks which have proved successful in other countries.    The notion of applying
the concept of a developmental state would be one example (Marquand 1988).
However, copying foreign institutions does not guarantee success as they might well be
inappropriate to Britain's institutional arrangements (Boltho and Toniolo 1999, pp.12-
13; Whiteside and Salais 1998, p.5).  More than this, there often seems to be a
fundamental inconsistency in such arguments: institutional analysis emphasises path
dependency and context which is then ignored in prescribing 'foreign' solutions. As
Martin Smith puts it, 'Analytical institutionalism in this sense undermines normative
institutionalism' (Smith 2000, p.205).
Secondly, we need to consider the nature of Britain's institutional arrangements in
order both to understand policy choices and to develop a more sophisticated and
realistic view of alternative policy options.  Government had grown from the
nineteenth century but there remained a widely held preference for a 'centreless
society' (Lowe and Rollings 2000).    Government action in peacetime was constrained
by an appreciation of the traditional means by which continuity and order were
maintained.    While governments could be strong and interventionist, as shown during
the First and Second World Wars, there was always a need to maintain the appearance
of class neutrality (Daunton 1996).    Thus central government had to operate within
this existing system of governance in order to retain its legitimacy.    The first instinct
of government departments was, as a result, not to interfereʕand certainly not to be
seen to interfereʕin the wider economy except as a last resort.    This was particularly
true where self-autonomy and self-regulation remained strong and where, as a result,
it was believed there were limits to what the government could achieve.
The Tresury's attitude to the NEDC provides an example of this.   As noted earlier, the
Treasury by the summer of 1961 was trying to get ministers and their officials to faceup to the decisions required to improve Britain's growth performance and economic
efficiency.    The problems they highlighted bear close resemblance to the weaknesses
raised more recently by Broadberry and Crafts, in particular the need to increase
competitive pressures and reform industrial relations (Broadberry and Crafts 1996).
Yet rather than simply remedying these faults by government legislation, as
Broadberry and Crafts imply the government should have done, the Treasury
preferred to use the NEDC to persuade the representatives of labour and business, as
well as other government departments, of the strength of their case.    Modernisation
beyond Whitehall could not be imposed:
ʦThe NEDCʧwas conscientiously tripartite.    It took as one of its first and most
vital tasks to win the confidence of industry and the trade unions.   Given the
instruments of economic management available at this time as well as the values
of British political culture about the role of government , it is difficult to see how
ʦthe NEDCʧcould have done otherwiseʜ.    Voluntary action remained the most
effective vehicle for creating and putting into effect an economic plan (Blank 1977,
p.700).
Modernisation had to be achieved by consensus and co-operation rather than by
coercion because Treasury officials believed that many of the obstacles to improved
growth and economic efficiency were beyond the government's control.   The NEDC
was a way of opening negotiations with industry and labour in order to find solutions
in these areas (PRO 1961b).  As Otto Clarke, one of the key forces in Treasury
thinking, put it:
Throughout the territory of industrial development NEDC is of great importance .
The question of industrial modernisation is surely the heart of NEDC, and surely
NEDC would have to be the government's main instrument and contanct with
private industry in this matter (or go out of business altogether).  We have
always thought that this was a very useful potential function for NEDCʕindeed
the territory for which it is uniquely fitted (PRO 1962).
This belief in the potentially key role of the NEDC in industrial modernisation is
important because it shows that even in the early 1960s the Treasury remained
hesitant about interfering too directly and in too specific a manner in the economy
despite all the wartime and post-war changes in the role of government.
However, it could be argued that while this may illustrate continuity in Britain's
institutional relationships, the opportunity to make fundamental change to them had
already passed.  The key period in this sense, as has been emphasised in theliterature on the impact of Britain's institutional arrangements on its economic
performance, relates to the immediate post-war period and the 'post-war settlement'
that was established then.   It is whether this was a missed window of opportunity to
reform Britain's institutions into a more growth-encouraging form that historians have
focused their attention.  This notion of windows of opportunity, or critical junctures,
relates to Krasner's idea of institutional development as a punctuated equilibrium
(Krasner 1984).  These critical junctures are seen as crucial opportunities for
fundamental change and reconstruction after the Second World War is seen as one
such critical juncture.   Thus, as noted at the start of the paper, Eichengreen argues
that the post-war settlements in Europe were particularly conducive to sustained
growth while that in Britain was not (Eichengreen 1996).   Indeed, Broadberry and
Crafts have argued that the post-war settlement reflected continuities from the inter-
war period with Britain unable to change its institutions appropriately (Broadberry
and Crafts 1992; Bean and Crafts 1996; Crafts 1999).   The implication here is that
there was a missed opportunity to improve Britain's long-term growth record after
1945 and that government policy was the culprit, even if it was politically rational
(Broadberry and Crafts, 1996; Crafts 1993).
Yet there is a considerable historical literature which emphasises how attempts were
made to adopt new institutional relations, particularly with regard to industrial
relations, which were closer to the Eichengreen model.    Noel Whiteside has shown
how the Labour government tried to get trade unions to accept the concept of a social
wage given welfare reforms and the maintenance of food subsidies and price controls
(Whiteside 1996a; Whiteside 1996b).  Nina Fishman has recently shown how the
Labour government were committed to increased state intervention in industrial
relations after the war (Fishman 1999).  Related to this, the government made
attempts in 1950-51 to establish a Wages Advisory Council, an independent body to
advise on wage demands (Jones 1987, pp.39-40).   The Labour government was also
committed to the maintenance of some economic controls permanently, notably
including price control (Rollings 1992) and Tomlinson and Tiratsoo have shown the
many efforts made by the government to improve productivity (Tiratsoo and Tomlinson
1993).    Thus Joe Melling concludes:
The persistence of voluntaryist bargaining in the UK was not a foregone
conclusion or the inevitable outcomes institutional preferences (Melling 1996,
p.19).
Why did all of the initiatives of the 1945-51 Labour governments which have been
outlined above ultimately come to nothing?   Why is it that much of the popularity of
the managed economy at this time stemmed from it being less interventionist andselective than the alternatives, not as a step towards greater intervention (Middleton
1996, p.474; Blank 1977, p.685)?    Melling believes that one crucial factor was that:
British governments appear to have consistently placed the need to preserve
equilibrium in the tripartite relationship of employers, labour and the state above
their inclination to push through measures of economic modernisation (Melling
1996, p.18).
Thus he regards this period as a missed opportunity when the government could have
pushed through modernisation if it had had the will so to do.
However, there is an assumption here that government could disentage itself-on one
level it is seen as endogenous to society and the economy and on the other as exogenous,
able to rise above societal constraints.   In this respect Cortell and Peterson's recent
work on windows of opportunity is helpful (Cortell and Peterson 1999).    They suggest
that the punctuated equilibrium model used by Krasner and others since is deficient.
In its place they suggest a three-part model.  First, exogenous pressures, both
domestic and international, can open windows of opportunity for institutional
transformation. Whether institutional transformation follows is dependant on the
actions and interests of the actors involved, especially state officials, but that, in turn,
their ability to capitalise on this window will depend on their institutional position or
capacity (Cortell and Peterson 1999, p.179).   As they continue:
The prevailing institutional arrangements create opportunities for, or place limits
on, officials' abilities to make change.   In short, all three factor triggers, change-
oriented preferences and institutional capacity must be present for institutional
change to occur in a democratic state.
Unlike the Westminster model which seems to have dominated economic historian's
perceptions of the policy process, governments are constrained by their contexts, they
are not able to disengage themselves from the existing institutional framework.    In
Britain, even when there have been windows of opportunity, as in the 1940s and late
1950s, it has not simply been the case that these opportunities were missed just
because governments and their officials had no preference for institutional reform.
The institutional capacity to impose institutional reform was not there because of the
historical from of governance in Britain.  When added to the fragmentation in
government that occurred in the post-war period it is not surprising that the Treasury
felt for much of this period that it was losing , or had lost, control.
CONCLUSION CONCLUSION CONCLUSION CONCLUSIONAlthough often highlighted as fundamental to Britain's economic performance, most
recently in the literature on Britain's post-war relative economic decline, the level of
attention and understanding of how British government operates and the policy
process involved remains basic and oversimplified.    In this sense government remains
a black box economic historians look at what goes in (policy goals) and look at what
comes out (policy effectiveness) and judge policy success on this basis.    While this has
a theoretical   basis in the Westminster model, this was always a partial organising
perspective,  ignoring or hiding as much as it illuminated.  The recognition and
application of alternative organising perspectives results in rather different
approaches to government policy making.    These can result in interesting and more
nuance insights into the impact of the policy process on policy outcomes.    Thus we can
see that modernisation in Britain after 1945 had to be attempted by means of
consensus rather than coercion but that this still did not guarantee effective policy
outcomes.    This is not too argue that government is blameless and that governmental
failure cannot exist, rather it is to argue that the issues may not always be as
straightforward as is often implied in the blanket criticism made by some economic
historians (Kirby 1992).  Government matters but so too does understanding
government and the constraints under which it operates.   As Aoki et al. (1996) have
noted of the East Asian experience, 'Government is not a neutral arbiter exogenously
attached to the economic system to correct the failure of private coordination, but it is
an endogenous (integral) element of the system with the same informational and
incentive constraints as other economic agents in the system' (p.xvii).REFERENCES REFERENCES REFERENCES REFERENCES
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